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ABSTRACT 
 
A game theoretic approach to threat intent inference 
 
In the adversarial military environment, it is important to efficiently and promptly predict 
the enemy’s tactical intent from the lower level spatial and temporal information. In this 
paper, we propose a decentralized Markov game (MG) theoretic approach to estimate the 
belief of each possible enemy COA (ECOA), which is utilized to model the adversary 
intents. It has the following advantages: 1) Decentralized. Each cluster or team makes 
decisions mostly based on the local information. We put more autonomies in each group 
allowing for more flexibilities; 2) Markov Decision Process (MDP) can effectively model 
the uncertainties in the noisy military environment; 3) Game model with three players: 
red force (enemies), blue force (friendly forces), and white force (neutral objects); 4) 
Deception.  With  the  consideration  that  asymmetric  enemy  may  manipulate  the 
information available to friendly force; we integrate the deception concept in our game 
approach to model the action of purposely rendering partial information to increase the 
payoffs  of  the  enemy.  A  simulation  software  package  has  been  developed  with 
connectivity  to  the  Boeing  OEP  (Open  Experimental  Platform)  to  demonstrate  the 
performance of our proposed algorithms. Simulations have verified that our proposed 
algorithms are scalable, stable, and satisfactory in performance. 
 1.    Introduction 
 
Game  theory  provides  a  framework  for  modeling  and  analyzing  various  interactions 
between  intelligent  and  rational  decision  makers,  or  players  in  conflict  situations,  in 
which every individual decision maker is not in complete control of other decision units 
entering  into  the  environment.  The  idea  of  the  game  can  be  tracked  back  to  the 
Babylonian  Talmud  which  is  the  compilation  of  ancient  law  and  tradition  set  down 
during the first five centuries A.D..  However, it was not until 1944 that the mathematical 
theory of games was invented by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern [1]. 
 
Mathematically, Game theory is used to study strategic situations where players choose 
different actions in an attempt to maximize their returns, which depend upon the choices 
of other individuals. To make optimal movement in multi-agent systems, strategies of 
other agents should be taken into account and therefore it is essential to be able to model 
the behavior of the opponents.  
 
In the adversarial military environment, it is important to efficiently and promptly predict 
the  enemy’s  or  adversary  tactical  intent  from  the  lower  level  spatial  (terrain)  and 
temporal  information.  Standard  AI  tools  for  solving  decision-making  problems  in 
complex situations, such as dynamic decision networks and influence diagrams, are not 
applicable  to  these  kinds  of  situations.  Game  theory,  on  the  other  hand,  provides  a 
mathematical  framework  designed  for  the  analysis  of  agent  interaction  under  the 
assumption of rationality where one tries to identify the game equilibria as opposed to 
traditional utility maximization principles. A game component in multi-agent decision-
making thus uses rationality as a tool to predict the behavior of the other agents [11-15]. 
 
In  this  paper,  the  focus  is  on  the  application  of  Markov  Game  [2],  the  multi-agent 
extensions of Markov Decision Processes (MDPs), to the estimation of enemy course of 
actions (COAs) [3], which approximately model the intent of targets. By successfully 
assessing  possible  future  threats  from  the  adversaries,  the  decision  makers  can  make 
more  effective  targeting  decisions,  plan  friendly  COAs,  mitigate  the  impact  of 
unexpected  adversary  actions,  and  direct  sensing  systems  to  better  observe  adversary 
behaviors.  We  have  achieved  the  following  important  results.  First,  we  developed  a 
highly innovative framework for threat intent prediction in an urban warfare setting based 
on Markov (Stochastic) game theory. It consists of three closely coupled activities: 1) the 
processing and integration of information from disparate sources to produce an integrated 
object  state;  2)  the  reasoning  and  grouping  the  cooperative  objects  which  perform 
common tasks; 3) predicting the intensions and CoAs of asymmetric threats. Second, we 
have  implemented  an  adversary  Markov  game  model  with  three  players:  red  force 
(enemies),  blue  force  (friendly  forces),  and  white  force  (neutral  objects).  This  is  a 
significantly  extension  of  existing  game  theoretic  tools  for  modeling  and  control  of 
military air operations, which does not explicitly consider the neutral force (or civilian) as 
an  intelligent  player  [13].  Inherent  information  imperfection  is  considered  and 
implemented in two methods: 1) decentralized decision making scheme; and 2) deception 
with  bounded  rationality.  Third,  a  software  prototype  has  been  developed  with 
connectivity  to  the  MICA  (Mixed  Initiative  Control  of  Automa-Teams)  Open Experimental  Platform  [4]  (ontology-based  virtual  battlespace)  to  demonstrate  the 
performance of our proposed approach. It has verified that our proposed algorithms are 
scalable,  stable,  and  perform  satisfactorily  according  to  the  situation  awareness 
performance metric. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we will summarize the technical approach, 
which  includes  basic  ideas  of  Markov  game,  threat  intent  inference  framework,  and 
moving horizon control approach for game solution. Section 3 describes the experimental 
results. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
2.    Markov Game Framework 
 
We  propose  a  Markov  game  (MG)  theoretic  approach  to  estimate  the  belief  of  each 
possible enemy COA (ECOA) because 1) Decentralized. Each cluster or team makes 
decisions mostly based on the local information. We put more autonomies in each group 
allowing for more flexibilities; 2) Markov Decision Process (MDP) can effectively model 
the uncertainties in the noisy military environment; 3) Game model with three players: 
red force (enemies), blue force (friendly forces), and white force (neutral objects). Game 
framework is an effective and ideal model to capture the nature of military conflicts: the 
determination  of  one  side’s  strategies  is  tightly  coupled  to  that  of  the  other  side’s 
strategies and vice versa. With the consideration that an asymmetric threat (terrorist) may 
act like a neutral or white object (civilian), we also model the actions of white units in our 
game framework; 4) Deception [10]. With the consideration that asymmetric enemy may 
manipulate the information available to friendly force; we integrate the deception concept 
in our game approach to model the action of purposely rendering partial information to 
increase the payoffs of the enemy.   
 
The game intent inference framework is shown in Fig. 1.  It is constructed from the initial 
state and evolved according to the transition rule. At each time k, blue and red actions are 
 
Fig. 1 Stochastic game model for intent inference decided according to the various sensor data, rules of engagement, rationality, terrain 
information and current state. These actions decide the updated probability distribution 
over the state space according to the transition rules, which also takes terrain information 
as one of the inputs. Only one state is selected as the next state. In the real battle, the state 
is chosen by the nature while in our model it is drawn based on the probabilities of all 
possible states. The bigger the probability is, the easier it will be drawn. 
 
By definition, a Markov (stochastic) game is given by (i) a finite set of players  N ; (ii) a 
finite set of states S ; (iii) for every player  N iÎ , a finite set of available actions 
i A  (we 
denote the overall action space  i
N i A A Î ´ = );  (iv) a transition rule  ) ( : S A S q D ® ´ , (where 
) (S D  is  the  space  of  all  probability  distributions  over  S );  and    (v)  a  payoff  function 
N R A S r ® ´ : .  For  the  intent  inference  problem,  condition  (i)  is  obviously  satisfied. 
Conditions (ii) and (iii) hold because we assume that rules of engagement and terrain 
information are known and each player has a limited set of COAs given by the doctrines, 
and terrain information, etc. For example, a river will limit the actions of ground forces. 
(iv)  and  (v)  are  designed  according  to  the  specific  situations  including    terrain 
information.  For our threat prediction problem, we obtain the following discrete time 
decentralized Markov game: 
 
Players (Decision Makers) --- Although, in our distributed (decentralized) Markov game 
model, each group (cluster, team) makes decisions, there are three main players: enemy, 
friendly force, and white objects. All clusters of enemy (friendly force, or white objects) 
can be considered as a single player since they have a common objective.  
 
State Space --- All the possible COAs for enemy and friendly force consist of the state 
space. An element  S sÎ  is thus a sample of enemy and friendly force COAs composed 
of a set of triplets (Resource, Action Verb, and Objective). As an example, an enemy 
COA  might  be:  the  red  team  1  (Resource)  attacks  (Action  Verb)  the  blue  team  2 
(Objective). In the context of this report, it is assumed that, for the enemy COAs, the 
Resource is always an adversary entity while the Objective is a friendly asset. Similarly, 
for the friendly force COAs, Resource is a friendly asset and Objective is an adversary 
entity.  ) , , (
W R B s s s s = and
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W W S s Î  is the COAs 
of White force (neutral objects). 
 
Action  Space  ---  At  every  time  step,  each  blue  group  choose  a  list  of  targets  with 
associated actions and confidences (probability distribution over the list of targets, i.e., 
the  sum  of  the  confidences  should  be  equal  to  1)  based  on  its  local  battle  field 
information, such as the unit type and positions of possible targets, from level 2 data 
fusion.  Let  B
i D  denote the action space of the 
th i  blue team. Each  element  B
i d of 
B
i D  is 
defined as 
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where  B
i p  is  the  probability  of  the  action-target  couple  (
B
i a , B
i t ),  which  defined  as  the 
action 
B
i a  to  target  B
i t .  Therefore,  the  action  space  of  blue  side  B
i R i D A B Î ´ =
1 .  As  an 
example,  for  the  blue  small  weapon  UAV  1  in  blue  team  1,  its  action  might  be 
B d1 ={(attack, red fighter 1, 0.3), (fly to, red fighter 2, 0.5), (avoid, red fighter 3, 0.2)}.  
 
Similarly,  each  red  cluster  (obtained  from  the  level  2  data  fusion)  determines  a 
probability distribution over all possible action-target combinations.  Let 
R
i D  denote the 
action space of the 
th i  red cluster. Each element  R
i d of 
R
i D  is defined as 
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where  R
i p  is the probability of action 
R
i a  to target  R
i t .  Therefore, the action space of red 
force  R
i R i D A R Î ´ =
2 .  A possible action for red platform 1 (red fighter 1) is 
R d1 ={(attack, 
small weapon UAV 1, 0.6), (move to, blue solider 2, 0.2), (avoid, blue solider 1, 0.2)}. 
Remark: Action and Action Verb are different concepts. Action is a set of triplets with 
associated probabilities while Action Verb is just a component of triplet composed of 
Resource, Action Verb and Objective. All Actions are included in 
1 A  for player 1 (Blue 
force) and 
2 A  for player 2 (Red force). All Action Verbs are enumerated in 
B A  for player 
1 (Blue force) and 
R A  for player 2 (Red force).  
 
The  actions  of  white  objects  are  relatively  simple.    The  main  action  type  is  the 
movement. Let  W
i D  denote the action space of the 
th i  white unit.   Each element  B
i d of  B
i D  
is defined as  
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where W
i p  is the probability of action 
W
i a  to target  W
i t . 
 
Transition rule --- Due to the uncertainty properties of military environments, we assume 
that the states of the Markov game have inertia so that the decision makers have more 
chance in pursuit of the objective of the previous actions. We define an inertia factor 
vector  T i
m
i i i
i ) , , , ( 2 1 h h h h ￿ =  for player i, where  i m  is the number of the teams or clusters of 
player  i  ,  and  1 0 £ £
i
j h ,  i m j £ £ 1 .  So,  for  the 
th j  team  of  the 
th i player,  there  is  a 
probability of  i
j h  to keep the current action-target couple and a probability of (1- i
j h ) to 
use the new action composed of action-target couples.  
 
There are two steps to calculate the probability distribution over the state space S, where 
1 , + k k s s  are states of time step  k and  k+1 respectively, 
3 2 1 , , k k k a a a ,  are the decisions of 
player 1 (blue force or friendly force) , player 2 (red force or enemy),  and play 3 (white 
force) respectively, at time step k. 
 
·  Step 1: with the consideration of inertia factor vector 
i h , we combine the current 
state with decisions of both players to obtain fused probability distributions over all possible action-target couples for red and blue forces. To do this, we first 
decompose the current state into the action-target couples for each team of each 
player  (red  force  or  blue  force).  Let  ) ( k
i
j s Y denote  the  resulting  action-target 
couple related to the 
th j  team of the 
th i player. For example, if there is one triplet 
of (blue team 1, attack, red fighter 2) in the current state 
k s , then the action-target 
couple for blue team 1 (the first team of blue force) is  ) (
1
1 k s Y = (attack, red fighter 
2).  Secondly,  for  each  specified  team,  say  the 
th j  cluster  of  player  2  (enemy 
force), we fuse its action-target couples via modifying the probability of each 
possible action-target couple based on the following formula 
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There are four cases in Eq (6): 1) The action-target couple  ) , (
R
j
R
j t a  only occurs in 
the current action of 
th j  cluster of player 2 and is not in the current state
k s , which 
can be mathematically  represented by  )} ( { ) , ( ) , , (
2
k i
R
j
R
j
R
i
R
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R
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R
j s t a and d p t a Y Ï Î . Then 
we  know  the  probability  of  ) , (
R
j
R
j t a  in  current  state 
k s  is  0  and  probability  of 
) , (
R
j
R
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probability of the action-target couple  ) , (
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j t a  happens both in the current action of 
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k s . Then we know the probability of  ) , (
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R
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Similarly, the new probability distribution for the 
th j  team of player 1 (blue 
force) is  
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The new probability distribution for 
th j  team of player 3 (white force) is 
( )
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
Y Ï Ï
Y Î Ï
Y Î Î + -
Y Ï Î -
=
)} ( { ) , ( ) , , ( , 0
)} ( { ) , ( ) , , ( ,
)} ( { ) , ( ) , , ( , ) 1 (
)} ( { ) , ( ) , , ( , ) 1 (
| ) , (
3
3 3
3 3 3
3 3
k j
W
j
W
j
W
j
W
j
W
j
W
j
k j
W
j
W
j
W
j
W
j
W
j
W
j j
k j
W
j
W
j
W
j
W
j
W
j
W
j j j
W
j
k j
W
j
W
j
W
j
W
j
W
j
W
j j
W
j
k
W
j
W
j
s t a and d p t a
s t a and d p t a
s t a and d p t a p
s t a and d p t a p
s t a p
h
h h
h
         (6) 
 
 
·  Step 2: we determine the probability distribution over the all possible outcomes 
of state  1 + k s ,  
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where  1 m  is the number of the teams or clusters of player 1 (blue force),  2 m  is the 
number of the teams or groups of player 2 (red force) and  3 m  is the number of the 
units  of  player  3  (white  force).  )} , , {(
B
i
B
i
B
i t a r is  the  set  of  the  all  possible  (with 
positive  probability)  triplets  for  the 
th i team    of  player  1  (blue).  Therefore  
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 contains all the possible (with positive probability) triplets for the 
blue force. From the step 1, we know that the fused probability of each specified 
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j
B
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B
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j s t a p | ) , (  defined in equation (5). With the assumption that all teams 
of blue force are independent, we obtain the overall probability of blue force, 
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j s t a p are  the  overall 
probabilities  of  the  enemy  and  white  force,  respectively.  So  the  probability 
distribution over the all possible outcomes of state  1 + k s  (composed of all possible 
sub-states of blue force and red force) can be calculated via equation (7). 
 
Payoff Functions --- In our proposed decentralized Markov game model, there are two 
levels of payoff function for each player (enemy, friendly force, or white force). 
 
·  The  lower  level  payoff  functions  are  used  by  each  team,  cluster  or  unit  to 
determine the team actions based on the local information. For the 
th j  team of 
blue force, the payoff function is defined as ) , , ~ (
B
k
B
j
B
j
B
j W d s f , where  s s
B
j Í ~  is the 
local  information  obtained  by  the  team,  and 
B
k W ,  the  weights  for  all  possible 
action-target couples of blue force, is announced to all blue teams and determined 
according the top level payoff functions by supervisor of Blue force.  
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action-target couple ( B
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B
i t a , ) for 
th j  team of blue force according to the positions 
and features, such as platform values and defense/offense capability, of blue and 
aimed platforms. Similarly, we obtain the lower level payoff functions for the 
th j  
team of red and white force, 
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Remark 1: For some asymmetric threats, such as suicide bombers, the payoff 
functions may only consider the loss of the blue side. For some camouflage, and 
concealment entities, their objectives are to hide themselves and move close to the 
blue units. Other deception units will do some irrational movements to hide their 
true goals with the cost the time. 
 
Remark 2: The white units only care about their possible losses. For an example, 
when a dangerous spot is detected, normal white units will find a COA to keep 
themselves as far as possible from the spot.      
 
·  The top level payoff functions are used to evaluate the overall performance of 
each player. 
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where k is the time index. In our approach, the lower lever payoffs are calculated 
distributedly and sent back to commander/supervisor via communication 
networks. 
 
Remark 3: Since the gain functions  ) ~ , , , (
B
j
B
i
B
i
B s t a j g  for blue force,  ) ~ , , , (
R
j
R
i
R
i
R s t a j g  
for  red  force  and  ) ~ , , , (
W
j
W
i
W
i
W s t a j g  for  white  force  are  different  functions, 
asymmetric force and cost utilities can be straightforwardly represented in our 
model. In addition, after an irregular adversary is detected, a different type of 
gain function will be assigned dynamically.   
 The strategies --- In this paper, we try several well known types of strategies. 
 
·  Min-max strategies [5]. This kind of strategies will give a conservative solution 
to minimize the possible maximum “loss”. Actually, in our problem, it is a max-
min solution in the sense that each player maximizes the possible minimum his 
payoffs. So, this kind of strategies is also called safest solutions.  
 
·  Pure Nash Strategies with finite horizon.  In game theory, the Nash equilibrium 
(named  after  John  Nash  [6]  who  proposed  it)  is  a  kind  of  optimal  collective 
strategy in a game involving two or more players, where no player has anything 
to gain by changing only his or her own strategy. If each player has chosen a 
strategy and no player can benefit by changing his or her strategy while the other 
players keep theirs unchanged, then the current set of strategy choices and the 
corresponding payoffs constitute a Nash equilibrium. In our approach, we use a 
game  search  tree  (shown  in  Fig.  2)  to  find  the  solution.    In  our  proposed 
approach, the solution to the Markov game tree is obtained via a K time-step 
look-ahead approach, in which we only optimize the solution in the K time-step 
horizon. The suboptimal technique is used successfully for reasoning in games 
such as chess, backgammon and monopoly. 
 
·  Mixed Nash Strategies.  A mixed strategy is used in game theory to describe a 
strategy  comprised  of  possible  actions  and  an  associated  probability,  which 
corresponds  to  how  frequently  the  action  is  chosen.  Mixed  strategy  Nash 
 
Fig. 2  A game tree search approach to find pure Nash strategies with finite planning 
horizon  (moving planning window) equilibria are equilibria where at least one player is playing a mixed strategy. It 
was proved by Nash that that every finite game has Nash equilibria but not all has 
a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.  
 
·  Correlated  Equilibria  [7].  Unlike  Nash  equilibria,  which  are  the  concept  of 
equilibria  formulated  in  independent  strategies,  the  correlated  equilibria  were 
developed from the correlated strategies in noncooperative games. The correlated 
equilibrium of a Markov game describes a solution for playing a dynamic game 
in which players are able to communicate but are self-interested. Based on the 
signals generated by the correlated devices and announce to the each decision 
maker,  players  choose  their  actions  according  to  the  received  private  signals. 
There are two types of correlation devices: autonomous and stationary devices. 
An autonomous correlation device is a pair  , where (i) 
i
n M  is a finite set of signals for player i at time step n, and (ii)  ) ( ) ( : n n M n M d D ® , 
i
n N i n M M Î ´ =  and  1 2 1 ) ( - ´ ´ ´ = n M M M n M ￿ .  A  stationary  correlation  device  is  a 
pair ,  where  ) (M d D Î and
i
N i M M Î ´ = .  Actually,  a  stationary 
correlation device is a special case of an autonomous correlation device, where 
i
n M  is independent of n and  n d  is a constant function that is independent of n.  
 
Given  a  correlation  device  ,  we  define  an  extended  game   .  The  game 
 is played exactly as the original game, but at the beginning of each stage n, 
a signal combination  N i
i
n n m m Î = ) (  is drawn according to the probability function 
) , , , ( 1 2 1 - n n m m m d ￿ and each player i is informed of  i
n m . Then each decision maker 
must  base  his  choice  of  actions  on  the  received  signal.  Any  deviator  will  be 
punished via his min-max value. The punishment only occurs if a player disobeys 
the recommendation of the device. It was proved in [7] that every Markov game 
with an autonomous correlated device admits a correlated equilibrium. 
 
·  Sequential Nash Strategies [8]. A sequential game is one in which players choose 
their strategies following a certain predefined order, and in which at least some 
players can observe the moves of other 
players  who  make  decisions  preceded 
them. The sequential game is a natural 
framework  to  address  some  real 
problems, such as the Action-Reaction-
Counteraction paradigm used in military 
intelligence  and  advertising  campaigns 
strategies of several competing firms in 
economics.  In  our  approach,  we  use  a 
turn-by-turn scheme shown in Fig. 3.  At 
each  step  k,  the  control  strategy  from 
only  one  player,  say,  player  1  (blue 
force), is applied and the corresponding 
outcome  will  be  observed  by  player  2 
 
Fig. 3 Two-player Sequential Game (enemy force) before it decides its next action. This is helpful in estimating the 
opponent’s  intent  because  each  time  only  one  action  is  applied  and  the  state 
changes from the action is observed.  
 
·  Leader-Follower Strategies [9].  With the consideration of the limited and non-
perfect  communication,  we  use  the  Stackelberg  conception  to  model  the 
cooperation part between the commander and the local teams. The commander 
(called  the  leader)  declares  incentives  to  the  local  teams  (called  followers)  in 
order to induce them to accept his desired system behavior as the common desired 
behavior.  The  Leader-Follower  strategy  is  useful  in  our  clearly  defined 
hierarchical systems which have asymmetric information structures (in our case 
the leader, or commander know the cost functional of every decision maker, or 
local teams while the followers know only their own). 
 
 
To  efficiently  reason  the  enemy’s  intent  or  COAs,  we  divide  our  approach  into  two 
phases: training phase and reasoning phase. In the first one, we measure or observe the 
enemy’s actions and compare them with the actions generated by our model. The results 
are used to tune or adjust the transition rules. In the reasoning phase, we fix the transition 
rules and use the generated red actions as the intent of enemy. 
 
Deceptions [10] are used to make the other player act in our own advantage by making it 
believe that the game is in a state other than the actual one.  It is only possible in partial 
information games. We propose an equilibrium approach to deception where deception is 
defined to be the process by which actions are chosen to induce erroneous inferences so 
as to take advantage of them. This framework differs from the earlier literature on multi-
stage  games  with  incomplete  information  in  that  whether  the  player  has  a  perfect 
understanding of the strategy employed by his opponent. We introduced two types of 
deceptions: cognitive type and strategy environment. 
 
Cognitive types are defined as follows. Each player i forms an expectation about the 
behavior of the other player by pooling together several nodes in which the other player 
must move. Each such pool of nodes is referred to as a class of analogy. Players are also 
differentiated according to whether or not they distinguish between the behaviors of the 
various types of their opponent. Formally, a cognitive type  of player i is characterized by 
(Ani, di) where  Ani stands for player i’s  analogy partition and di is a dummy variable that 
specifies whether or not type ti distinguishes between the behaviors of the various types tj 
of player j. We let di = 1 when type ti distinguishes between types tj’s behaviors and di = 
0 otherwise. 
 
A  strategic  environment  is  described  by  (Y,ui,p)  where  p  denotes  the  prior  joint 
distribution on the type space Q = Q1 ￿ Q2. To simplify notation we will assume that the 
types of the two players are independently distributed from each other, and we will refer 
to  pi  =  (pti)ti  as  the  prior  probability  of  player  is  type  where  pti  denotes  the  prior 
probability of type ti. 
 3.    Simulations and Experiments 
 
In the Simulation part, we build a virtual battle-space and a typical urban scenario based 
on the Ontology concept, which is an explicit, formal, machine-readable semantic model 
that defines the classes (or concepts) and their possible inter-relations specific to some 
specified domain.  To simulate our data fusion approach, we implemented and tested our 
battle-space, scenario and algorithms on the MICA Open Environment Platform (OEP) 
based on the Boeing C4Isim simulation, which models the collection, processing, and 
dissemination of battlefield information. 
 
We used a scenario shown in Fig. 4 to demonstrate the performance of our proposed 
threat prediction and situation awareness algorithm. In the shown urban environment, the 
blue force’s missions are to capture and secure two bridges which are guarded by the red 
force. The two bridge locations are well connected via wide roads highlighted by dashed 
lines. The red force includes armed vehicles, fighters and asymmetric forces hiding in 
and acting like the white objects (the civilians and vehicles). The blue force consists of a 
few fighters with close air support provided by several unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) 
such as small sensor UAVs and small weapon UAVs, which will, if needed, do some 
searching and fighting tasks too. We assume the total offense force and total defense 
force are almost at the same level. There is no dominant one. There are several choices 
for the red force to guard these objectives efficiently. They can deploy all red units to 
protect one location. However, the blue force can capture other places first. The blue 
force faces the same dilemma. So the main challenge for both sides is to understand the 
situation from the fused sensor data and predict the intent of the opponent under the 
“believed” war situation. 
 
 
Fig. 4: A Simulated Scenario  
 For this scenario, in a specific simulation run (correlated equilibrium method) as shown 
in Fig. 5, blue team 1 and blue team 3 were assigned to capture Bridge 1 and Bridge 2, 
respectively, almost in the whole simulation period of 30 minutes. On the other hand, 
Red team 1 and Red Team 3 were guarding Bridge 1 and Bridge 2 almost all the time. 
Blue Team 2 was strategically moving based on the threat prediction from the Markov 
game. At the same time, the Red Force was dynamically deploying Red Team 2 and 
trying to keep a balance between the Blue force and the Red force at each bridge. As 
shown in the movie of the demo, we can see that after about 15 minutes of movement, at 
Bridge 1, the Blue force achieves domination with 2 Blue teams (Blue Team 1 and Blue 
Team 3) to attack 1 red team (Red Team 1). The Blue force captures and secures Bridge 
1 before Red Team 3 reaches Bridge 1 to help Red Team 1. During this Phase 1 battle, 
our  algorithm  detected  two  asymmetric  adversaries  with  deception  (a  person  and  a 
vehicle) which were hidden in a vast of background harmless civilian activity.  After the 
capture of Bridge 1, the Blue side deployed a part of the remaining force of Team 1 and 
Team 3 to secure the bridge and others to help Team 2 to capture Bridge 2. Finally, the 
Blue side won the urban battle at a cost of 5 Blue soldiers and 6 small weapon UAVs. 
Another hidden asymmetric threat with deception (terrorist) was detected and killed in 
the Phase II battle of capturing Bridge 2. 
 
 
Fig. 5: Result of a simulation run 
 In  addition  to  the  explained  run,  we 
performed  many  experiments.  We 
compared  the  results  using  the  various 
options, such as without game theoretic 
fusion (without levels 2 and 3), without 
asymmetric Threat Prediction (with level 
2 but the payoff function of game model 
at level 3 doesn’t change dynamically), 
Game  approach  with  mixed  Nash 
Strategy,  and  game  approach  with 
Correlated Equilibria. The results (since 
the  simulation  is  stochastic,  results  are 
the mean of 10 runs for each case) are 
shown in Fig. 6 (Only the damage information of the Blue side is shown). From the 
damage comparison results, we can see that our proposed Markov game framework with 
correlated  equilibrium  and  deception  consideration  for  threat  detection  and  situation 
awareness is better than the other methods. 
 
4.    Conclusions 
 
Game theoretic tools have a potential for threat prediction that takes real uncertainties in 
Red plans and deception possibilities into consideration. In this paper, we have evaluated 
the  feasibility  of  the  advanced  adversary  intent  inference  algorithm  and  their 
effectiveness through extensive simulations. It has verified that our proposed algorithms 
are scalable, stable, and perform satisfactorily. 
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